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An Alternative Contractual Approach
to Holistic Health Care
I. INTRODUCTION
Acupuncture, midwifery, therapeutic massage, meditation, and other
holistic health practices are attracting increasing attention, both because
clients are dissatisfied with aspects of traditional health care' and because
holistic practices emphasize prevention and wellness, unlike traditional med-
icine's focus on pathology and disease.2 Despite this fundamental difference
between holistic practice and orthodox medicine, the legal system continues
to apply to the holistic field the same regulations and legal theories that
developed alongside traditional medical practice. Both holistic and traditional
practices are governed by medical practice acts that license and regulate the
healing arts on the assumption that regulation is necessary to protect the
public from serious harm.3 Many holistic health practices, however, carry
less risk of serious harm than surgery, drug prescription, and other modem
medical techniques.4 Yet all are approached in civil courts under negligence
theory, in which the professional community defines the standard of care the
practitioner owes to a client. Because an externally determined standard of
care places the greatest responsibility for healing on the practitioner, it is
inimical to holistic health practice, in which the client shoulders the major
burden for improvement.
A. What is Holistic Health?
A holistic approach to health rests on the belief that "medicine is but one
perspective from which we may perceive health and disease."- 5 Holistic prac-
titioners regard modern medicine as "a science of pathology geared to deter-
mine scientifically valid principles for diagnosing and treating illness, injury,
and disease. ' ' 6 Health is more than the absence of disease, however, and a
holistic outlook highlights preventive care, general well-being, and energy.7
I. Cousins, Introduction to K. PELLETIER, HOLISTIC MEDICINE: FROM STRESS TO OPTIMUM
HEALTH at xv (1979).
2. Green, Responsibility for Health, 2 J. HOLISTIC HEALTH 76, 78 (1977). Holistic health encompasses
five general areas: (1) assessment (e.g., kinesiology, psychic reading, and iridology); (2) rebalancing and im-
proving energy (e.g., chiropractic, acupuncture, and polarity therapy); (3) self-regulation (e.g., biofeedback,
yoga, meditation, and visualization); (4) body work (e.g., Alexander Technique, Feldenkrais Movement
Method, therapeutic massage, and Rolfing); and (5) natural medicine (e.g., naturopathy, homeopathy, nutrition,
and natural childbirth). This list is not exhaustive. For excellent introductions to the field, see HEALTH FOR
THE WHOLE PERSON (A. Hastings, J. Fadiman & J. Gordon eds. 1980) and WHOLISTIC DIMENSIONS IN
HEALING: A RESOURCE GUIDE (L. Kaslof ed. 1978).
3. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Gordon, The Paradigm ofHolistic Medicine, in HEALTH FOR THE WHOLE PERSON 9 (A.
Hastings, J. Fadiman & J. Gordon eds. 1980).
5. Green, Responsibility for Health, 2 J. HOLISTIC HEALTH 76, 76 (1977).
6. Green, Creating New Roles for Changing Times, in WHOLISTIC DIMENSIONS IN HEALING: A
RESOURCE GUIDE 4 (L. Kaslof ed. 1978).
7. Gordon, supra note 4, at 17.
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Because the client controls lifestyle changes that encourage health and
prevent disease, individual responsibility forms the cornerstone of holistic
health practice. 8 Clients depend more on themselves to attain health than on
professionals and institutions; 9 the practitioner is a resource person to aid the
client in determining what areas of health are within his or her control'0 rather
than an external force who "provides" health. As an active partner in health
maintenance, the client cannot passively accept the judgment of a profes-
sional. "
Client education is essential if clients are to accept this personal responsi-
bility for health. ' 2 Holistic practitioners believe that their clients can under-
stand holistic processes and techniques and can make intelligent decisions
about their own health. During the last two decades public sophistication
about health care has increased, and people have begun to seek practitioners
who will explain to them and confer with them, not merely patronize them. 13
Despite the great variety of holistic health practices, all rest on a belief in
the body's "innate capacity for self-healing."' 14 Pain and other symptoms
indicate more fundamental problems, and rather than eradicate only the
symptoms directly the holistic practitioner helps a client strengthen his or her
body so that it can restore its own natural balance. 15 Guided imagery can
activate the immune system and can be particularly effective in conjunction
with cancer treatments. 16 Nutritional counseling can lead to improvements in
the body's chemical balance. 17 Biofeedback, yoga, and meditation can re-
duce, without drugs, the physiological effects of stress. ' Exercise and mas-
sage can replace steroids and aspirin to mobilize limbs stiffened by arthritis.' 9
Rolfing, a system of deep massage, reduces muscular stress and increases
energy by restoring the natural positions of body masses.20 Acupuncture also
8. Id. at 18.
9. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH GROUP, PUBLIC REGULATION OF HEALTH CARE OCCUPATIONS IN
CALIFORNIA. A STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE CALIFORNIA BOARD OF MEDICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE
BY THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH GROUP 30 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PARG STUDY].
10. Green, Creating New Roles for Changing Tunes, in WHOLISTIC DIMENSIONS IN HEALING: A
RESOURCE GUIDE 4, 5 (L. Kaslof ed. 1978).
I1. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 4, at 3.
12. See id. at 18.
13. Cousins, Introduction to K. PELLETIER, HOLISTIC MEDICINE: FROM STRESS TO OPTIMUM
HEALTH at xvii (1979).
14. Gordon, supra note 4, at 18.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 19. See also 0. SIMONTON, S. MATTHEWS-SIMONTON & J. CREIGHTON, GETTING WELL
AGAIN 129-31 (1978). In guided imagery a patient visualizes or imagines, under a practitioner's guidance, the
physiological process that his or her body will use to eradicate the disease from which it suffers. See generally
0. SIMONTON, S. MATTHEWS-SIMONTON & J. CREIGHTON, GETTING WELL AGAIN (1978).
17. Gordon, supra note 4, at 19. See also M. GERSON, A CANCER THERAPY 5-9 (1958).
18. Shapiro, Meditation and Holistic Medicine, in HEALTH FOR THE WHOLE PERSON 159 (A. Hastings,
J. Fadiman & J. Gordon eds. 1980). See also H. BENSON, THE RELAXATION RESPONSE (1976).
19. Gordon, supra note 4, at 18-19.
20. Rolf, Structural Integration: A Contribution to the Understanding of Stress, 5 BULL. STRUCTURAL
INTEGRATION 5 (1976).
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increases energy; it assuages pain as well. 2' The natural approach of these
techniques appeals to those who are alarmed by the widely publicized dangers
of some drugs.- For example, some chemical compounds may cause birth
defects; antibiotics have unpleasant side effects and can become less effective
over time; steroid drugs disturb the endocrine system; 3 and diethylstilbestrol
can cause vaginal cancer in offspring of mothers who ingested the drug during
pregnancy.24
Finally, holistic health emphasizes the entire healing process and not
merely the end result of the treatment. 25 For example, the effectiveness of
therapeutic touch depends on the quality of the relationship between practi-
tioner and client. 26 Traditional medicine's increasing specialization, its de-
pendence on advanced technology, and a concomitant decrease in the per-
sonal aspects of the healing relationship have made holistic health care's
human warmth and integrated approach more attractive to many people than
the medical model. 27
B. Proposal for a New Approach to Holistic Health
A legal approach that emphasizes the consensual nature of the relation-
ship between a holistic practitioner and a client is more appropriate to holistic
care than the current negligence approach to healing relationships, in which
tort law automatically defines, under a judicially established standard, the
relationship between the parties, their responsibilities, and the reasonable-
ness of the client's expectations. When practitioner and client are concerned
with maintaining health and energy rather than with treating disease, when the
therapy carries a low potential for harm, and when the nature of the agree-
ment and distribution of responsibilities can be made reasonably clear, a
contract can protect the interests of both client and practitioner, encourage
the parties to work together toward a common goal, and provide needed
flexibility in the developing field of holistic health care.
After reviewing the relevant legal issues as they have emerged in suits
against physicians and drugless healers, 28 this Comment will suggest an alter-
21. Bresler, Kroening & Volen, Acupuncture in America, in WHOLISTIC DIMENSIONS IN HEALING: A
RESOURCE GUIDE 133 (L. Kaslof ed. 1978).
22. Cousins, Introduction to K. PELLETIER, HOLISTIC MEDICINE: FROM STRESS TO OPTIMUM
HEALTH at xv (1979).
23. Id.
24. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 321 (J. Pritchard & P. MacDonald eds. 16th ed. 1980).
25. P. FLYNN, HOLISTIC HEALTH: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CARE 12 (1980).
26. See, e.g., Krieger, The Potential Use of Therapeutic Touch in Healing, in WHOLISTIC DIMENSIONS
IN HEALING: A RESOURCE GUIDE 182 (L. Kaslof ed. 1978).
27. Cousins, Introduction to K. PELLETIER, HOLISTIC MEDICINE: FROM STRESS TO OPTIMUN
HEALTH at xvi-xvii (1979).
28. Cases concerning health practitioners who are not M.D.s (such as chiropractors, podiatrists, and
naturopaths) are classified in the legal literature under the heading "Drugless Healer." See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2D
1188-1224 (1951 & Supp. 1982). See also Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (acupuncture);
Bowland v. Municipal Court for Santa Cruz County, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 556 P.2d 1081, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1976)
(midwifery).
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native contractual approach for holistic practitioners. It will then analyze
three hypothetical situations based on holistic health practice, first as actions
grounded on negligence theory and then as actions based on contracts be-
tween the parties.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL SETTING: DRUGLESS HEALERS UNDER
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE THEORY
To date the only cases reaching the appellate level that deal with health
practitioners who are not physicians or surgeons have concerned chiroprac-
tors, podiatrists, naturopaths, 29 acupuncturists, and midwives. 30 No appellate
civil case has yet appeared that deals solely with the energy-maintaining
holistic assessments and therapies on which this Comment focuses. Appellate
records reveal a few cases concerning midwifery and acupuncture brought by
or against a state under state medical practice acts, 31 but the only civil mal-
practice cases that have reached appellate courts have been brought against
chiropractors, podiatrists, and naturopaths.32
One is tempted to speculate on the reasons for this paucity of client
actions against holistic practitioners. Are clients generally more content with
their treatment than are physicians' patients? Do holistic therapies simply not
cause the kind of harm or the kind of disappointments that lead to civil suits?
Would damages be too difficult to determine? Do clients forego court action
because practitioners are not heavily insured? Or do the losing parties, for
some unknown reason, simply fail to appeal?
Answers to these questions are not available. It is clear, however, that so
far courts have analyzed claims against drugless healers under negligence
theories developed in malpractice suits against orthodox medical practition-
ers. The following survey of these theories shows that some may be appropri-
ate when applied to holistic health practitioners if and when holistic healing
cases reach civil courts, while others are at best cumbersome and at worst
inimical to the goals and practices of holistic health. Particularly in determin-
ing the parties' reciprocal duties and the existence of an express warranty of
results, a contract between the parties is preferable because it is explicit and it
allows intentional variation from the norms supplied by tort law. A contract
29. Naturopath: "a practitioner of naturopathy." Naturopathy: "a system of treatment of disease empha-
sizing assistance to nature and sometimes including the use of various medicinal substances (as herbs, vitamins,
and salts) and certain physical means (as manipulation and electrical treatment)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 150S (1966).
30. See cases collected in Annot.. 19 A.L.R.2D 1188-1224 (1951 & Supp. 1982).
31. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (state residents seeking acupuncture treatment
challenged restrictive licensing rule on grounds that it violated their right to choose health treatment-and,
therefore, their right of privacy-by effectively eliminating the practice of acupuncture in the state); Bowland v.
Municipal Court for Santa Cruz County, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 556 P.2d 1081, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1976) (midwives
charged with unlicensed practice of medicine claimed licensing statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 33-58.
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also may encourage the parties to cooperate, a dynamic that is lacking when,
tort law defines the practitioner-client relationship.
A. Tort Law
1. Appropriate Standard of Care
When a medical malpractice suit is brought as a negligence action, an
important issue is the appropriate standard of care that the practitioner must
meet to avoid liability. Most jurisdictions use the similar locality standard: a
practitioner is "required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally pos-
sessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar
communities. 33 A minority of jurisdictions still use the strict locality rule, in
which the practice of other physicians in the same community defines the
standard of care.34
Drugless healers must comply with the similar locality standard, defined
in two early cases as the practice of others from the same school.3 In the 1936
case of Hardy v. Dahl3 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
standard of care for a naturopath is based on his own school of practice and on
the treatment he holds himself out to practice. The naturopath defendant was
not required to possess the highest degree of skill recognized by the medical
profession.37 In 1951 the Michigan Supreme Court focused on the same school
concept in Byant v. Briggs.38 There, the defendant osteopath had performed
a thyroidectomy on the plaintiff's decedent; the patient died the following
day. The plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that the osteopath should be held to
the standards of the medical profession and attempted to introduce expert
testimony by a medical surgeon to establish the osteopath's standard of
care. 39 In upholding a directed verdict for the defendant, the court stated that
the defendant had fully performed his duty to use methods prescribed by the
profession of osteopathy.4
In a more recent case against a podiatrist, Dolan v. Galluzzo,4' the
Illinois Supreme Court tied the same school standard to state licensing re-
quirements. In Dolan a patient brought suit against the defendant podiatrist
for performing allegedly negligent surgery on his foot. In granting the defen-
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). In Prosser's words, "[B]y undertaking to render
medical services ... [the physician] will ordinarily be understood to hold himself out as having standard
professional skill and knowledge." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
34. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 32.
35. See, e.g., Dolan v. Galluzzo, 77 I11. 2d 279, 396 N.E.2d 13 (1979); Bryant v. Biggs, 331 Mich. 64, 49
N.W.2d 63 (1951); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1975); see also Annot., 85
A.L.R.2D 1022-32 (1962 & Supp. 1979); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2D 1188-1224 (Supp. 1970).
36. 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936).
37. Id.
38. 331 Mich. 64, 49 N.W.2d 63 (1951).
39. Id. at 67-69, 49 N.W.2d at 65-66.
40. Id. at 72, 49 N.W.2d at 67.
41. 77 III. 2d 279, 396 N.E.2d 13 (1979).
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dant's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of a physician on the stan-
dard of care that a podiatrist owes his patients, the court noted that by regulat-
ing various kinds of practice the legislature had recognized differing schools
of practice but did not favor any one over the others.42
Who is qualified to testify on the appropriate standard of care was the
central issue in Whitehurst v. Boehm. 43 Plaintiff sued his podiatrist for negli-
gence when surgery to remove a scar on his foot resulted in infection, necessi-
tating further surgery by an orthopedic surgeon. 44 In upholding the trial
court's refusal to admit testimony by an orthopedic surgeon on the standard
of care in orthopedic surgery, the appellate court stated that "[t]he standard
of care required of a podiatrist cannot be established through testimony of an
orthopedic surgeon [on the standard of care in orthopedic surgery] who is not
familiar with the practice of podiatry; it can only be established by the tes-
timony of another podiatrist or one equally familiar with that field of prac-
tice. 45
Two problems would arise if courts should apply the same school stan-
dard of care to all types of holistic practitioners. First, not all holistic practi-
tioners must be licensed by the state.46 Since licensing helps to define a school
and provides official legislative recognition of a practice, schools in un-
licensed areas are less readily defined by courts. 47 When licensing require-
ments do not regulate a holistic practice or when divergence of opinion exists
within a developing holistic field, it is difficult to determine who should set the
standard of care for the rest of the field. The unfair result may be that anyone
who does not need a license or who does not practice under the principles of a
recognized school will automatically be judged a charlatan,48 without an indi-
vidual evaluation of competence.
The second problem with applying the similar school standard of care to
holistic healers is that in some localities few practitioners of any given therapy
may be available to testify. This will be true both when a small number of
42. Id. at 284, 396 N.E.2d at 15-16. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 32, at 163 n.50. When there are
differing schools of thought, the court judges a doctor by the beliefs and procedures of the school he follows.
When a legislature recognizes a method of treatment through licensing requirements, courts must accept it as a
recognized school. 77 I11. 2d 279, 284, 396 N.E.2d 13, 16 (1979).
43. 41 N.C. App. 670, 255 S.E.2d 761 (1979).
44. Id. at 671-72, 255 S.E.2d at 763-64.
45. Id. at 674, 255 S.E.2d at 765. Testimony of practitioners from another school may be admissible for
some purposes, however. In Creasey v. Hogan, 292 Or. 154, 637 P.2d 114 (1981), an orthopedic surgeon was
allowed to give his opinion concerning defendant podiatrist's treatment of a condition that is treated in the same
way by podiatrists and orthopedic surgeons. The court distinguished the use of the surgeon's testimony to show
defendant's possible negligence, which was permissible, from use of the testimony to establish the podiatrist's
duty of care to his patients, which was not. Id. at-, 637 P.2d at 122. See also Frazier v. Hurd, 380 Mich. 291,
157 N.W.2d 249 (1968).
46. For example, iridologists and Rolfers, the practitioners discussed in the hypotheticals (see infra text
accompanying notes 165-67 & 186-94) need not be licensed under state laws.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 84-86.
48. See, e.g., Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 P. 282 (1920) (herbologist held to standards of surgical and
medical practice absent a readily identified school of herbology).
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practitioners are active in a community and when fear of arrest for unlicensed
practice of medicine keeps holistic practitioners from working openly. 49
Some of these difficulties would be obviated by establishing a practi-
tioner's duties through agreement with an informed client. Reluctant or un-
available expert testimony would not be needed to determine the standard of
care; the duties would be explicit in the agreement. Moreover, an externally
defined and judicially imposed standard of care conflicts with the premise of
individual responsibility on which holistic health care rests. A contractual
agreement allows the parties to allocate responsibilities as they see fit.
2. Duty to Refer Clients
Tort law requires drugless healers to refer their patients to medical practi-
tioners "when the situation obviously calls for it." 50 This principle was articu-
lated in Kelly v. Carroll5 in 1950. Plaintiffs decedent consulted defendant
naturopath for abdominal pains and was treated with hot and cold packs,
electrical massage, and laxatives. The patient's condition worsened, but
defendant threatened to abandon the case if patient's wife called a physician.
After twelve days the wife finally summoned a physician. His diagnosis of
appendicitis came too late, however, and the patient died shortly thereafter.52
The court held for the plaintiff, stating that drugless healers must be trained to
recognize when their methods are ineffective 53 and must, in such cases, refer
patients to medical practitioners.- 4
Dramatic and bizarre fact patterns of this kind are rare in the legal litera-
ture on drugless healers. A recent case, Mostrom v. Pettibon,5  is more help-
ful in analyzing a practitioner's duty to refer. In Mostrom the plaintiff con-
sulted defendant chiropractor for abdominal and back pain caused by two
back injuries. After taking X-rays the chiropractor adjusted the plaintiff's
spine on several occasions. At trial the parties disagreed over whether defen-
dant had recommended a neurological consultation, but in any event plaintiff
eventually saw a neurologist, who diagnosed an obstruction in the spinal cord.
Ensuing corrective surgery left plaintiff with severely limited use of his arms
and legs. He sued the chiropractor for failing to refer him promptly to a
medical practitioner.56
In holding that the evidence was sufficient for the case to go to the jury,
the court in Mostrom stated that a licensed chiropractor's duty of care has
49. See, e.g., PARG STUDY, supra note 9, at 47-48. The body workers, psychic healers, spiritualists, and
nutritionists surveyed need not be licensed in California. The report indicates that they constantly fear arrest for
practicing medicine without a license.
50. Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482,498,219 P.2d 79, 88, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950). See generally
Annot., 58 A.L.R.3D 590, 591 (1977); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2D 1188, 1206 (1951 & Supp. 1970).
51. 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
52. Id. at 486, 219 P.2d at 81-82.
53. Id. at 492, 219 P.2d at 85.
54. Id. at 497-98, 219 P.2d at 88.
55. 25 Wash. App. 158, 607 P.2d 864 (1980).
56. Id. at 159-61, 607 P.2d at 865-66.
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three parts: (1) to identify problems that are purely medical, in contrast to
those that are amenable to chiropractic treatment; (2) to refrain from chiro-
practic treatment when a reasonable chiropractor should know that it is not
appropriate and "may aggravate the condition" ;57 and (3) to refer patients to a
medical practitioner when medical treatment is indicated.58
The duty to refer can easily be included in a contract. Such a clause can
protect both practitioner and client when a condition is discovered that is not
responsive to the holistic practitioner's techniques. After describing to the
client what a proposed treatment can and cannot do, the practitioner need
only include a term confirming (1) that he or she does not treat disease and
conditions beyond the scope of his or her practice and (2) that if such condi-
tions become apparent the client should consult a physician,59 preferably with
the practitioner's assistance.
3. Defenses
Assumption of risk as a defense in negligence suits against drugless
healers was recognized in Hardy v. Dahl,60 a 1936 case in which a father
brought his infant to a naturopath for treatment of what both the parent and
the practitioner thought was tonsillitis. When the child died of diphtheria two
weeks later, the father sued the naturopath. The court noted that the father
believed in naturopathic medicine, had engaged the defendant repeatedly to
treat other members of his family, and did not believe in the use of diphtheria
antitoxin unless absolutely necessary. 6' Although the court recognized that
plaintiff had assumed the risk of standard naturopathic treatment, the case
was remanded for a new trial to determine whether defendant had been neg-
ligent according to the standards of the naturopathic profession. If the trial
court were to find that defendant's actions had been negligent, plaintiff, of
course, would merit a recovery. 62
The defense of assumption of risk has succeeded in several other cases.
In Bryant v. Biggs63 the court
assumed that plaintiff's decedent was aware that defendants were osteopathic
practitioners and that for reasons satisfactory to himself he sought treatment from
them for the cure or alleviation of his condition .... Plaintiff is not in position [sic]
to complain that the methods and standards of practice ... observed by another
school were not followed. 6'
57. Id. at 163, 607 P.2d at 867.
58. Id. Accord Tschirhart v. Pethtel, 61 Mich. App. 581, 584. 233 N.W.2d 93, 95 (1975).
59. For further discussion of referrals in the context of contract, see infra text accompanying notes 163 &
180.
60. 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936).
61. Id. at 531-33, 187 S.E. at 788-89.
62. Id. at 532, 187 S.E. at 789. The outcome of the new trial has not been reported.
63. 331 Mich. 64, 49 N.W.2d 63 (1951). See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
64. 331 Mich. 64, 72-73, 49 N.W.2d 63, 68.
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The court went on to say that a patient who "selects a practitioner of a
recognized school of treatment" adopts the methods of that school.65 Unlike
Hardy, the plaintiff in Bryant did not charge that the defendant had failed to
comply with the standards of his own school.
In Whitehurst v. Boehm66 "plaintiff elected to undergo foot surgery by
one other than a pure medical or surgical practitioner. Under prevailing law,
he cannot now complain that the mode of treatment employed by one he
voluntarily selected was less than the most competent available in the world
of medicine." 67 The court observed that it is the legislature's duty to ensure
"that the innocent layman knows the limitations of those engaged in the
medically 'allied occupations."' ' Thus, the legislature must see that ad-
equate information is available, even though the choice of practitioner rests
ultimately with the patient.
These cases establish that when a knowledgeable client chooses a drug-
less healer, he or she assumes the risks of that school's standard practice. In
addition, Hardy indicates that a client does not assume the risk of the neg-
ligent practice of that method and that one who selects a drugless healer is still
protected by law from incompetence.
Although contributory negligence is a possible defense, 69 it has not been
significant in cases against drugless healers, perhaps because these cases can
be easily disposed of with assumption of risk. Both contributory negligence
and assumption of risk are particularly appropriate defenses in a holistic
health setting since clients must assume responsibility for their own care. 70 A
written agreement between the parties would not only clarify a client's stan-
dard of care for his or her own health and safety (the issue in contributory
negligence), 7' but would also define the risks a client assumes by specifying
the limits of the proposed therapy. 72
B. Breach of Warranty in Medical Malpractice
Some malpractice cases are brought on grounds of both breach of war-
ranty and negligence. The general rule covering physicians' liability under
65. Id. at 73, 49 N.W.2d at 68 (quoting 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 44 (1951)).
66. 41 N.C. App. 670, 255 S.E.2d 761 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
67. 41 N.C. App. 670.677,255 S.E.2d 761, 767 (1979). See also Spead v. Tomlinson, 73 N.H. 46,59 A. 376
(1904) (patient who engaged Christian Science practitioner for appendicitis could not complain that treatment
was improper); Kirschner v. Keller. 70 Ohio App. 111, 42 N.E.2d 463 (1942) (epileptic patient discontinued
anti-epileptic drug on chiropractor's advice, knowing the consequences; the court said the patient submitted to
treatment with full knowledge of the risk).
68. 41 N.C. App. 670. 677. 255 S.E.2d 761. 767 (1979).
69. In Champs v. Stone. 74 Ohio App. 344,58 N.E.2d 803 (1944). the court held that a patient who allowed
an obviously intoxicated physician to administer a hypodermic injection was contributorily negligent in the
resulting injury. This case. however, did not concern the choice of a drugless practitioner; defendant was a
medical doctor.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 8-1I.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
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contract provides that a physician may "contract to cure his patient, or to
accomplish a particular result .... [and] may be liable for breach of contract
when he does not succeed." 73 Without an express agreement, however, there
is no warranty of results. 74 Some courts also require that an express warranty
of results be supported by consideration separate from the fee for service. 75
The problem becomes one of interpretation: which promises are express
and which implied? Courts have found the following statements to be express
(actionable) promises: (1) Proposed abdominal surgery would take "care of all
your troubles... [y]ou can eat as you want to .... [Y]ou can throw your
pill box away"; 76 (2) proposed hand surgery would make the hand "a hundred
percent perfect"; 77 and (3) removal of a growth by a certain procedure would
effect a cure.78 Mere opinions regarding efficacy of treatment, however, are
not actionable.79
In Cirafici v. Goffen, 0 a 1980 Illinois case, a dental patient alleged that
her dentist induced her to permit insertion of dental implants by promising
that she would be able to eat corn on the cob and other foods that she could
not eat with her dentures. After two and a half years, during which time the
plaintiff had been unable to eat anything other than soft foods and had suf-
fered constant pain, the dentist removed the implants and substituted new
dentures. 8' The count of dental negligence was still pending when the appel-
late court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the breach of warranty
action. The appellate court held that the contract to cure was explicit and,
therefore, actionable and that no additional compensation was needed be-
cause the promise had been made as an inducement to enter into the original
contract. 
82
The Cirafici court based its holding on several circumstances that would
also exist in contractual agreements between holistic practitioners and their
clients. This was a nonemergency situation in which both parties had had an
opportunity to evaluate the bargain. Moreover, language of the parties
73. W. PROSSER. supra note 33, § 32.
74. See Gault v. Sideman, 42 I11. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 436 (1963); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 3D 1221 (1972).
75. See, e.g., Cirafici v. Goffen, 85 III. App. 3d 1102. 1106-07,407 N.E.2d 633,636 (1980); see also Tierney.
Contractual Aspects oJ Malpractice, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1457. 1463 (1973).
76. Guilmet v. Campbell. 385 Mich. 57, 63. 188 N.W.2d 601, 603-04 (1971). But see Tierney. Contractual
Aspects of Malpractice, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1457 (1973). which criticizes this case and others that recognize an
,xpress contract to cure even without proof of explicit words of guarantee. Tierney believes that such holdings
discourage physicians from communicating optimism to their patients.
77. Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 115, 146 A. 641, 643 (1929).
78. Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 545, 127 N.E.2d 330, 331 (1955).
79. See, e.g., Rogala v. Silva, 16 III. App. 3d 63, 66, 305 N.E.2d 571, 573-74 (1973) (physician's warning
that sterilization operation would render plaintiff unable to bear children judged to be a statement of opinion and
not a warranty of results); Gault v. Sideman, 42 111. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 436(1963) (surgeon's statement that
herniated disk could be cured by surgery did not constitute warranty of cure); Hawkins v. McGee. 84 N.H. 114.
146 A. 641 (1929) (physician's prediction that patient would be hospitalized for three or fourdays and then would
be able to return to work was merely an opinion).
80. 85 III. App. 3d 1102. 407 N.E.2d 633 (1980).
81. Id. at 1102-03, 407 N.E.2d at 633-34.
82. Id. at 1107. 407 N.E.2d at 636-37.
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showed their intent. Finally, the requested damage award covered only the
cost of the implants and dentures and did not reflect a disguised tort-based
claim for pain and suffering or punitive damages. 83 The court implied that
when these elements are present an express contract should be recognized
even though a tort action would also be possible. If the parties reach a written
agreement before treatment begins, that language would reflect their actual
intent and the terms of the bargain, thus reducing the need for courts to imply
terms. The parties would also have time to consult lawyers for advice before
finalizing the agreement.
C. Licensing Requirements
State licensing statutes provide holistic healers with a third area of con-
cern in the current legal approach to health care. Problems arise not from
requirements that certain practices be licensed but from the broad scope of
the medical practice acts' definitions of "practicing medicine." In Ohio, for
example, the definition is relatively broad: anyone who "examines or
diagnoses for compensation of any kind .... for the cure or relief of a
wound, fracture, or bodily injury, infirmity, or disease" 84 is practicing med-
icine. The California definition is broader still and includes diagnosis of, or
treatment for, any "physical or mental condition of any person." 85 When
definitions are broad and medical boards or courts have wide discretion in
interpreting them, unlicensed practitioners and those with limited licenses
cannot determine what actions are within legal bounds. Thus it is easy for
these practitioners to step inadvertently out of their own small circles into the
area of practicing medicine without a license, an act that carries criminal
penalties.86 Besides creating a fear of arrest, which may limit the number of
holistic practitioners willing to work openly, licensing reinforces the concept
of an externally imposed standard of care. 87
83. Id.
84. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.34 (Page 1977) (emphasis added).
85. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). The full text of this section
reads:
Any person who practices or attempts to practice, or who advertises or holds himself or herself out as
practicing, any system or mode of treating the sick or afflicted in this state, or who diagnoses, treats,
operates for, or prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder,
injury, or other physical or mental condition of any person, without having at the time of so doing a
valid. unrevoked, or unsuspended certificate as provided in this chapter, or without being authorized
to perform such act pursuant to a certificate obtained in accordance with some other provision of law.
is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
Whatever the statutory definition of practicing medicine may be. courts and medical boards are always free
to devise their own interpretations, sometimes creating absurd results. For example, a medical board interpreted
.'surgery" to include ear piercing by ajeweler. The ruling was reversed in Hicks v. Arkansas State Medical Bd..
260 Ark. 31. 537 S.W.2d 794 (1976).
86. W. WADLINGTON, J. WALTZ & R. DWORKIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND MEDICINE 43
(19S0). The extent to which states prosecute unlicensed practitioners is difficult to determine because most
charges are brought by local agencies whose records are seldom available to the public. PARG STUDY. supra
note 9. at 15.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 33-49.
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The policy behind state licensing requirements "is to protect the public
by assuring minimum standards of competence" in the healing professions. 83
This regulatory power is justified by the assumption that "the practice of
medicine requires special knowledge, training, skill and care, that health and
life are committed to the physician's care, and that patients ordinarily lack the
knowledge and ability to judge his qualifications." 8 9 Licensing statutes and
medical boards, however, are not completely effective in protecting the
public. Once granted, medical licenses are virtually irrevocable except when
the licensee is found guilty of a crime or of gross misconduct. 90 Moreover,
disciplinary procedures may be difficult to enforce. On the same day that his
license is revoked, a doctor may obtain a court stay allowing him to continue
to practice. 91
A 1981 study of health care regulation in California suggests that the
elements which most strongly influence the quality of health care-the choice
of appropriate treatment, the equipment and technology used, and the skill of
practitioners-may lie beyond a medical board's powers and, therefore, be
unaffected by licensing requirements. 92 While a medical board can set min-
imum standards of practice, nongovernmental regulation of health care (for
example, by training institutions or peer oversight groups)93 may more ef-
fectively ensure quality health care because it generally results in higher
standards than does official licensure. 94
Of particular interest to holistic health practitioners is the study's sugges-
tion that the statutory definition of practicing medicine be replaced with title
licensure, under which only licensed physicians would perform surgery and
prescribe drugs and other practitioners with the requisite training would be
allowed to perform other enumerated procedures. Practitioners employing
therapies that are not statutorily specified would be allowed to work provided
they did not use any of the titles reserved to licensed practitioners. 95 Given
88. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DHEW PUBLICATION
NO. (OS) 73-88 at 51 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S REPORT]; see also Reetz v. Michigan. 188 U.S.
505 (1903).
89. Aitchison v. State, 204 Md. 538, 544, 105 A.2d 495. 498 (1954).
90. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 88, at 52. Long delays between the filing of the complaints and the
hearings are also common. The New York Times reported a recent case in which a hearing occurred 28 months
after the Massachusetts Licensing Board had filed a complaint against a physician. The doctor had pleaded
guilty to indictments which alleged that he had placed a "* malicious interest in making more money" over the
lives of his patients. Attributing the delay to "lack of resources," the Board's lawyer said that such delays occur
"'with embarrassing regularity.' " N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1982, at II. col. 1.
9 1. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 88, at 53. Under such a court stay two doctors in New Mexico who
were found guilty of fraud accumulated $1.5 million in malpractice judgments against them in two years. A
Denver physician was found to have caused at least two deaths and two cases of permanent injury while his
revocation was suspended. Id.
92. PARG STUDY, supra note 9, at 13.
93. Id. (quoting Forgotson & Cook. Innovations and Erperiments in Uses of Health Manpower-The
Effects of Licensnre Laws, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 733 (1967)).
94. PARG STUDY, supra note 9, at 13. In contrast to this suggestion, consider a physician's statement.
made at one of the California Medical Board hearings, that licensure is required to preserve the income and
prestige of physicians and that these in turn ensure quality health care. Id. at 33.
95. Id. at 58-59.
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clear descriptions of what a licensee may do (and of what others may not do),
nontraditional health practitioners would be free to pursue their work with
less risk of inadvertently practicing medicine.
Because licensing requirements may not guarantee client protection, and
because imprecise definitions of practicing medicine may inhibit holistic prac-
tice through fear of arrest and imposition of external standards of care, in-
dividual arrangements between the parties are advantageous in some circum-
stances. Particularly in holistic therapies in which the potential for harm is
low (requiring less protection by the state) and client responsibility is high,
practitioner-client agreements may provide adequate protection and greater
flexibility for both parties. 96
III. AN ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO
HOLISTIC HEALTH CARE
The effectiveness of holistic health care depends on a vigorous, coopera-
tive relationship between the parties. When the client carries considerable
responsibility for his or her own improvement, he or she must actively partic-
ipate in the healing process and cannot merely accept the practioner's min-
istrations. Tort-based rules in medical malpractice, however, grounded on the
"reasonable person" and "similar practice" standards, 97 downplay indi-
vidual responsibility. Therefore, because the needs, pressures, and circum-
stances that affect each client's well-being are unique, the rules governing
medical negligence cases are inappropriate. In contrast, contractual agree-
ments between the parties acknowledge each client's uniqueness and reflect
the actual distribution of responsibilities for health care.
A. Reasoning for a New Approach
Professor Epstein of the University of Chicago suggests that physicians
contract with their patients to establish a standard of care. 98 He cites the
"expansion of defendant's liability" as "[t]he most striking trend in the law of
tort" 99 and explains that, in the malpractice field, recent changes have in-
creased the physician's potential liability so that it approaches strict liabil-
ity.' o Epstein suggests that judicial insistence on a negligence approach to
medical malpractice cases explains this development. The physician's duty of
care to his or her patients arises in both tort and contract. Therefore, he
observes, greater emphasis on the contractual elements of the physician-
96. For further discussion of protection and flexibility under contracts in holistic practice, see infra text
accompanying notes 179-85. 204-09 & 216.
97. See infra text accompanying note I I and supra text accompanying note 33.
98. Epstein. Medical lalpractice: The Casefor Contract, I AM. BAR. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87 (1976).
99. Id. at 91. Epstein notes the reduced acceptance of contributory negligence and assumption of risk as
defenses and says that in the field of products liability the theory of privity of contract has given way to strict
liability. Id. at 91-92.
100. Id. at 98.
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patient relationship will create a better balance of responsibilities and dis-
tribution of the risks of health care.' 0'
Epstein reasons that when parties to a suit are strangers, a tort claim is
the only possible solution.'02 But "where the parties have entered into a
consensual relationship, the problem assumes in the end a contractual dimen-
sion even if the subject matter of the particular case is the physical harm to the
plaintiff." 103 Since without the consensual relationship between physician and
patient the physician would have no duty of affirmative action, a physician's
liability should be analyzed under the contract. 14
The unique consensual relationship between physician and patient means
that contract law may be more appropriate in this situation than tort law
because tort theory "works best at keeping people apart, not bringing them
together."' 05 The essence of a healing relationship, particularly in holistic
health, is cooperation of the parties to reach a desired result. Preoccupation
with implicit legal duties and standards interferes with the effectiveness and
efficiency of this practitioner-patient relationship and may cause defensive
practice by physicians who fear lawsuits.'06
Although Epstein addresses his contractual scheme primarily to reducing
the liability of physicians and the size of awards granted against them, his
ideas also fit the goals and practices of holistic health. A well-drawn contract
can clarify expectations and allocate responsibilities. Contracting may make a
court's task simpler, may keep many cases of disappointed expectations out
of court, and may encourage greater client input in the healing relationship. 
0 7
B. Informed Consent: The Linchpin Between Tort and Contract
The doctrine of informed consent is the linchpin in this shift of emphasis
from tort to contract law. A physician's duty to inform rests on the conviction
that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body." "0 Courts believe that
patients have an "abject" dependence on physicians for information needed
to make this determination.'°9 Therefore, the doctrine of informed consent
defines a physician's duty to disclose to a patient the risks inherent in pro-
posed treatment or surgery so that the patient may decide intelligently
whether to submit to the procedure. "0 If patients are capable of giving in-
101. Id. at 105-06.
102. Id. at 94.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 102.
105. Id. at 94.
106. Id. at 107 n.43.
107. To a limited extent, contracting occurs with express warranties; see supra text accompanying notes
80-83. Most express warranties, however, are unwritten and require considerable court interpretation. For a
discussion of contracts in holistic health practice, see infra text accompanying notes 179-85, 205-09 & 216.
108. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,93 (1914), overruted on other
grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
109. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
110. Id. at 786.
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formed consent to a procedure, presumably they are also capable of making
express contractual agreements with practitioners based on the same infor-
mation.
The scope of required disclosure remains the key issue in informed con-
sent actions. Most jurisdictions follow a professional standard, under which a
physician must follow either the standard of other physicians in the same or a
similar community, or the standard of a "reasonable medical practitioner." .
The professional medical community determines what information a physi-
cian must disclose to a patient, thus placing on the plaintiff the burden of
proving through expert testimony the customary practice.112
The modem trend, however, while still a minority approach, anchors the
scope of a physician's duty to disclose in the patient's right to be told of all
risks that might be material to an intelligent decision regarding treatment.
Two 1972 cases define this materiality rule.
In Canterbury v. Spence"3 the defendant physician was charged with
failure to divulge the possible consequences of a laminectomy. 14 In reversing
the lower court's judgment for defendant and ordering a new trial, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a physician's obligation to
his patient includes disclosure of all information that may be material to the
patient's decision." 5 The court criticized the professional standard of dis-
closure, arguing that it is wrong to regard medical practice as the source of a
physician's obligation to disclose. First, that standard encourages a con-
spiracy of silence between physicians who are eager to protect one another.
Second, it invites statements of individual opinion on what prevailing stan-
dards should be, rather than requires expert testimony on what the practice
really is. Third, it ignores the patient's individual circumstances. Last, and
most important, it gives primary decision-making power to the physician
rather than the patient and thus violates the patient's right to self-
determination. " 6 Canterbury establishes that the scope of the duty to disclose
is "measured by the patient's need, and that need is the information material
to the decision." 117
In Cobbs v. Grant"' the California Supreme Court further developed the
materiality rule, basing its decision on the premise that "[u]nlimited dis-
cretion in the physician is irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to
make the ultimate informed decision regarding the course of treatment to
which he knowledgeably consents to be subjected." " 9 The court emphasized
11. J. LUDLAM, INFORMED CONSENT 27 (1978).
112. Id. at 28-29.
113. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
114. Id. at 778. Laminectomy: "excision of a vertebral lamina; commonly used to denote removal of a
posterior arch." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 758 (23d ed. 1976).
115. 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
116. Id. at 783-84.
117. Id. at 786.
118. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
119. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
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that while the physician may appreciate the risks of procedures he proposes
and the risks of a decision to refuse treatment, only the patient is able to weigh
"these risks against [his] subjective fears and hopes .... Such evaluation
and decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the patient alone." 20 The
Cobbs court explained the bases for the materiality rule:
Preliminarily we employ several postulates. The first is that patients are generally
persons unlearned in the medical sciences and therefore, except in rare cases,
courts may safely assume the knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity.
The second is that a person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the
exercise of control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to
lawful medical treatment. The third is that the patient's consent to the treatment,
to be effective, must be an informed consent. And the fourth is that the patient,
being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject dependence upon and trust in
his physician for information upon which he relies during the decisional process,
thus raising an obligation in the physician that transcends arms-length transac-
tions. "2
Both Canterbury and Cobbs establish an objective test for materiality:
"material" information is not what this patient would, in hindsight, have
considered important, but what a reasonable person in the patient's position
would want to know in making a decision. 12 2 The Canterbury court considered
the following information essential: (1) Potential hazards of treatment, (2)
alternatives to proposed treatment, (3) results likely if treatment is refused,
and (4) the likelihood and magnitude of possible harm.'23 The physician is not
required to disclose risks of which the patient is aware, risks that are common
knowledge, and risks that are unknown to the medical community;' 24 nor is
disclosure required in emergencies or When the success of treatment depends
on nondisclosure (therapeutic privilege).'2'
The materiality rule is particularly appropriate to holistic health practice
because it rests on the premise that patients have the right to make decisions
affecting their own bodies. Accordingly, the exchange of information between
physician and patient is critical to the exercise of this right, and patients are
assumed capable of making "informed" decisions. In the field of holistic
health care clients shoulder major responsibility for the success of treatment,
and procedures are more readily explained and understood than in surgery
and other complex medical procedures. If clients can obtain enough medical
information from practitioners to give the required informed consent, as the
doctrine assumes, they can use the same information to forge agreements that
120. Id.
121. Id. at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
122. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,787, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-16 (1972).
123. 464 F.2d 772, 787-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
124. J. LUDLAM, supra note 11, at 37. Less frequently mentioned exceptions to the rule include risks that
are incurred only when a procedure is carried out incorrectly, and a patient's request that he not be informed. Id.
125. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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specify not only the risks entailed in a procedure (which valid informed con-
sent currently requires) but also clients' expectations about the extent of
"cure," practitioners' reasonable estimates of results, and the responsibilities
of each party.
The test of causality in an informed consent case remains a problem
under both the materiality rule and the professional standard. The plaintiff
must show that "his injury resulted from a risk that should have been, but was
not, disclosed"; 126 he or she must also show that had disclosure been made,
he or she would not have submitted to the procedure. 127 Under the materiality
rule the test is objective: causality exists if a "prudent person in the patient's
position" would have decided against the procedure had the person been
adequately informed of its potential risks.' 2 In contrast, the traditional stan-
dard uses a subjective test based on what this particular patient would have
decided had the risks been disclosed. 1
29
The Canterbury court echoed a major criticism of the traditional rule in
informed consent: the rule determines the scope of disclosure and the issue of
causality ("Would this patient have rejected treatment if additional facts had
been disclosed?") based on the patient's hindsight, after the harm has oc-
curred. '30 The materiality rule draws fire because it imposes a heavy burden
on physicians, who will spend more time in educating patients than in diag-
nosing and treating them. '
3
'
These criticisms are less germane when the doctrine of informed consent
is transposed into a contractual arrangement between a holistic health prac-
titioner and his or her client. The scope of the duty to disclose is defined
before the therapeutic relationship is formalized, and individualized terms
that reflect the unique informational needs of each client can be incorporated
into the contract. This obviates the need for proof of causality. Furthermore,
when procedures are neither highly technical nor highly risky, clients will
more readily understand them-without imposing an intolerable burden of
client education on the practitioner.
126. J. LUDLAM, supra note I11, at 33-34.
127. Id. at 34; see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
128. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
129. J. LUDLAM, supra note 11l, at 34.
130. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
131. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 297-98, 611 P.2d 902, 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 315-16 (1980) (Clark,
J., dissenting). In Truman the California Supreme Court extended the physician's duty to disclose to encompass
the risks involved in failing to undergo diagnostic tests. The patient died of cervical cancer at the age of 30 after
repeated refusals to undergo a diagnostic pap smear at defendant family physician's urging. Defendant had not
explained the risks of refusing the test, assuming that a woman of childbearing age knew what they were. Justice
Clark registered a strong dissent: it "'will impose upon doctors the intolerable burden of having to explain
diagnostic tests to healthy patients." Id. at 297, 611 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 315. He feared that the
majority's decision will force physicians to spend too much time in educating patients and that the resulting
increase in the cost of medical diagnosis will discourage people from visiting doctors. Id. at 298, 611 P.2d at 910,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
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C. Limitations of a Contractual Approach
1. Criticisms
Professor Epstein has addressed several objections to this contract ar-
rangement. First, critics may contend that patients require court protection
since their "abject dependence" on physicians for necessary information
makes them powerless. 132 Epstein counters that a patient need not evaluate
technical medical information, but will be more concerned with the physi-
cian's competence; he or she can investigate the doctor's training and reputa-
tion, shop around for a practitioner, switch physicians, or utilize a clinic that
employs a variety of physicians. 13 3 The client's investigations should be less
burdensome in the holistic field since much of the information will be easier
for a layperson to evaluate. Prospective patients can also consult library
references or confer with other physicians to obtain a second opinion. Ad-
mittedly, this kind of investigation will demand more time than most patients
now give to their search for a physician, but it is consistent with the respon-
sibility that holistic clients must assume for their own care. Of course, the
effectiveness of client investigation depends on the availability of adequate
and accurate information.
A second objection to allowing patients and physicians to contract is that
the parties are in unequal bargaining positions. The physician, with greater
knowledge and experience, may pressure the patient to agree to specific
terms. 34 When a patient is inadequately informed or does not understand a
proposed treatment, this kind of influence can be a very real danger. Given
sufficient information, however, a client may be protected by competition
from unequal bargaining power because he or she may consult with other
practitioners before signing an agreement. 135 But if state regulation of holistic
practices restricts the number of practitioners in a community, competition in
that field will disappear. 1
36
Third, although contracting may not protect patients from practitioner
fraud or incompetence in all cases, Epstein suggests that the inability of a few
people to contract wisely should not inhibit the rights of those who can pro-
tect their own interests and wish to make contractual arrangements from
which they expect to benefit. 137 Again, adequate public information about
practitioners is critical in guarding against fraud, whether in the traditional
medical field or in holistic care. Title licensure 13" and professional organiza-
132. Epstein, Contracting Oat of the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 20 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED.
228, 237 (1977).
133. Id. at 238.
134. Id. at 239.
135. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
137. Epstein, supra note 98, at 106.
138. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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tions that establish standards of practice and review would provide additional
protection.
Even when there has been unequal bargaining power or fraud, contract-
ing does not leave a client without redress. A client who believes that he or
she was unfairly persuaded to enter into an agreement can claim undue in-
fluence and, if successful, avoid the contract. ,39 Although this cause of action
will not help a plaintiff who has been injured, he or she will be able to recover
fees paid 140 on showing (1) an opportunity for the other party to exert undue
influence (a confidential relationship such as that between physician and
patient is deemed evidence of such an opportunity 41); (2) his or her own
susceptibility as the subservient party; (3) the practitioner's disposition to
exert undue influence; and (4) evidence of the "unnatural nature" of the
agreement. 42 A client may also bring a tort action for misrepresentation, but
will have to meet more demanding requirements: (1) representation, (2) fal-
sity, (3) scienter, (4) deception, and (5) injury.'43 If successful, however, the
client's recovery for injury could exceed the restitution of a contract
remedy. 144
If a client can show that a practitioner exerted pressure that constituted
duress, he or she can, again, avoid the contract and recover the fees paid. ,4
The client will have to show that, after the coercion was removed, he or she
did not ratify the contract by accepting its benefits or by failing to avoid it
promptly. '46 If the client has been injured he or she can also bring a tort action
since coercion leading to a traditional tort is actionable in tort. 1
47
Fourth, contracting in holistic practice may attract criticism because it
creates a new need for legal advice. Will parties require lawyers at their
elbows as they hammer out agreements? It is true that until practitioners and
clients learn what terms are workable, they will need legal assistance. More-
over, they should have it. Yet in many cases it will be more efficient to define
the parties' responsibilities and provide for foreseeable circumstances, with
legal help, than to engage counsel only after harm has occurred.
2. Consequences of Electing Contract Rather than
Tort as a Cause of Action
When an action is possible in either tort or contract, choice of the con-
tract cause of action may confer important advantages. 48 A contract action is
139. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAv OF CONTRACTS § 9-10 (1977).
140. Id. § 9-12.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. § 9-13.
144. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 92.
145. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-13 (1977).
146. Id. § 9-8.
147. Id.
148. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 92. See also supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
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preferable when the plaintiff can show that the practitioner failed to perform
an express promise,149 but cannot prove negligence'50 or injury. Contract
theory also provides advantages to a plaintiff when a tort action is barred by
the statute of limitations and when immunities shield the defendant from tort
liability. 'J' The defendant will benefit from an express contract when a dis-
appointed patient or client brings suit, because expectations and respon-
sibilities will be clear under the contract. 152
A successful tort action, however, may permit the plaintiff greater mone-
tary recovery 53 through awards for pain and suffering, punitive damages, and
recovery for wrongful death. Damages for breach of contract are limited to
those within the contemplation of the parties when the agreement was made'-
and may be restricted by the terms of the agreement itself.' 55
Thus, when the plaintiff is allowed to elect a cause of action, the wise
choice will depend on how much he or she can prove and the extent of injury.
When either tort or contract may be appropriate and the rules for recovery are
inconsistent, case law is unclear whether plaintiff may elect the cause of
action or must accept the court's decision. 56 Since holistic therapies that deal
with energy and well-being carry neither the risks of serious harm nor the
resulting high damage awards that are more prevalent in surgery and in drug
administration, the tort cause of action would in many instances provide no
marked advantages in recovery against a holistic practitioner.'57 Of course,
when injury can be shown a client may recover the usual panoply of tort
damages.
In any event, a tort action remains available when a contract fails for lack
of proof, uncertainty, illegality, or other reasons. Therefore, holistic practi-
tioners and clients who wish to contract may do so without fear that a court
will leave them without redress if it finds the parties' agreement invalid.
D. A Contractual Scheme Applied to Holistic Health Practice
How would contracting work in holistic practice? One commentator sug-
gests that practitioner and client should include the following elements in their
149. See supra text accompanying notes 73-83.
150. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 92.
151. Id. See also Malone v. University of Kan. Medical Center, 220 Kan. 371, 552 P.2d 885 (1976). In
Malone plaintiff brought suit in contract rather than in tort because defendant hospital had governmental tort
immunity under state law. However, since the claim was based on careless and incompetent treatment, the
Kansas Supreme Court dismissed the contract cause of action.
152. Disappointed patient expectations have been blamed for the recent mushrooming of medical malprac-
tice suits. Epstein, supra note 98, at 97. See also Green, Responsibility for Health, 2 J. HOLISTIC HEALTH 76,
77 (1977), and infra text accompanying notes 186-209.
153. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 92.
154. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
155. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 92.
156. Id. See also supra note 151 and text accompanying notes 80-83.
157. The court in Cirafici v. Goffen, 85 II1. App. 3d 1102, 1107,407 N.E.2d 633, 636-37 (1980), identified
several elements that make a contract action acceptable even though a tort action would also be possible. See
supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
158. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 92.
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contract. (1) The purpose of the contract should be described, indicating that
the parties have agreed on its terms. (2) The responsibilities of each party
should be explicit. The client's expectations should be clear, and the contract
should detail the specific skills, responsibilities, and decisions that are essen-
tial to the purpose and plan of the proposed therapy. (3) The contract should
specify the duration of the relationship and a means of modification or re-
newal. It may also make provisions for the resolution of disputes. 59
The process of making an agreement is as important as the terms them-
selves. The client should present a specific problem with which he or she
needs help. He or she may want to start with a medical evaluation, particu-
larly if an injury underlies the problem, and then seek a holistic practitioner
for help in reversing patterns of stress that may have aggravated the condi-
tion.' 60 A meaningful choice of practitioners is critical in this process. The
client must be able to find a practitioner who is willing to agree to terms that
the client finds important; in this way competition may reduce any difference
in bargaining power. ' 6' The client may be able to determine whether a given
practitioner belongs to a professional association whose standards will protect
the client's own interest.
At least one case concerning a holistic practitioner who contracts with
clients has reached the courts. An Oakland, California municipal court dis-
missed a charge of practicing medicine without a license, which had been
brought against a naturopathic physician, on a showing that the defendant had
begun to contract with clients to clarify what he could do as a nonmedicalpractitioner.'62 Written statements and medical referral forms indicated that
the defendant had encouraged clients to consult medical practitioners for
diagnosis and treatment of pathology that he was not trained to handle.' 63
Similar agreements in holistic health care relationships will have several
benefits. The responsibility for health will be reallocated so that clients bear
greater responsibility for their own care than in traditional medical relation-
ships. Clients will be on notice that holistic practitioners cannot substitute for
physicians in diagnosing and treating pathology. Contracting will allow the
development of new health roles in the healing professions since practitioners
will not be forced into existing licensing classifications. "Our greatest social
gain will come from restraining our impulses to license and regulate these new
professions before we have had an opportunity to develop concepts that are
appropriate to them." 64
159. Green, Legal Issues in a Health Revolution, in THE HOLISTIC HEALTH HANDBOOK 392, 394 (1978).
160. A medical evaluation may help to define the purpose of the practitioner-client contract. It can also
assist the client in evaluating the appropriateness of the holistic practitioner's methods in his or her particular
case.
161. Epstein, Contracting Out of the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 20 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED.
228, 239 (1977). See generally supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
162. California v. UlIman, No. 98,158, Municipal Court of Oakland, Piedmont Judicial District, Alameda
County. March 9. 1977.
163. Id.
164. Green, Legal Issues in a Health Revolution, in THE HOLISTIC HEALTH HANDBOOK 392,394 (1978).
The Provisional Ethical Standards of the California Health Practitioners Association require practitioners to
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IV. THE CONTRACT IN HOLISTIC HEALTH CARE:
THREE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS
The three hypothetical situations that follow illustrate how contracting in
a holistic health care relationship would differ from the current negligence
analysis used with drugless healers. The practitioners in these hypotheticals-
an iridologist and a Rolfer-work in fields that do not require licensing under
state law. The first situation addresses the potential for harm in holistic health
when the practitioner does not diagnose a pathological condition. The second
focuses on breach of warranty and lack of informed consent when a client is
disappointed with the results of treatment. The third analyzes the problems
that occur when a client suffers physical harm.
A. Potential for Harm Through Failure to Diagnose Pathological Condition
1. The Facts
Client consults Iridologist, complaining of listlessness and lack of ap-
petite. Iridologist determines that Client is a heavy smoker, drinks moderate-
ly, and consumes an alarming amount of fried fast foods. Relying on the
general color and texture of the iris and the dark spots within it to detect
chemical imbalances, weakness in general body areas, and disturbed organ
function,' 65 Iridologist determines that Client's digestive system is not func-
tioning properly.
Iridologist suggests that Client begin dietary changes with a cleansing diet
of fruit juice. Thereafter, if he follows a low-fat, high-bulk vegetarian diet and
exercises moderately every day, he should feel better. Iridologist also advises
Client to quit smoking and to reduce his alcohol intake.'6
Client stops smoking but cannot stay away from the Scotch. He tries the
diet, takes up swimming, and improves his general eating habits although he
continues to eat meat and makes periodic forays to McDonald's. He feels
more energetic and continues his version of Iridologist's recommendations for
about a year. At that point he consults his family physician for rectal bleed-
ing, 167 and the physician diagnoses a small malignant tumor of the colon that
requires surgery. The surgeon expresses his opinion that, had the malignancy
been discovered earlier, surgical removal of part of Client's colon could have
been avoided.
make "clear agreements" with their clients that cover the nature of the services to be given, the responsibilities
of each party, the duration of the agreement, and the mutual expectations of the parties. CALIFORNIA HEALTH
PRACTITIONERS ASSOCIATION, PROVISIONAL ETHICAL STANDARDS § 5. In addition, practitioners must give
prospective clients full information regarding their training, practice, and fees and must make clear that they are
concerned with "the dynamics of vital energy as distinct from the diagnosis and treatment of pathology." id. §§
1-2.
165. See B. JENSEN, THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF IRIDOLOGY 15-19 (1952).
166. These suggestions are typical in iridological consultations. Id. at 9-13.
167. Rectal bleeding is a symptom of cancer of the colon. Levin, Gastrointestinal Bleeding, in CURRENT
DIAGNOSIS 43 (H. Conn & R. Conn eds. 6th ed. 1980).
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2. Results of Tort Action
Client sues Iridologist for negligent failure to diagnose his cancer. The
duty of care that Iridologist owes to Client arises from the consensual rela-
tionship into which they have entered.'68 To establish the appropriate stan-
dard of care in diagnosis, Client would have to call other iridologists as expert
witnesses.'69 In a community standard jurisdiction these expert witnesses
would have to be practitioners in the same community; in other jurisdictions
they would have to follow a similar practice.'" The court would determine
who qualified as expert witnesses under these requirements, and the experts
would then testify on whether a school of iridology exists. If it does, further
testimony would be needed on the standard of practitioners from that school.
Do these iridologists normally diagnose, and if so, for what kinds of condi-
tions? Do they receive training that qualifies them to deal with problems like
the plaintiffs? Since iridologists do not diagnose pathological conditions but
merely assess a client's general state of health, '7t it is unlikely that the court
would find a duty to diagnose in the school of iridology. Therefore, Client
would have a weak case on duty to diagnose. But assuming arguendo that a
duty is found, the questions would be submitted to the jury.' 72
The jury would decide whether the training and practice of Iridologist
measured up to the standards of other iridologists of his school. If it found a
breach of the standard, Client would have to prove that his alleged harm
resulted from Iridologist's failure to diagnose.'73 Again, expert testimony
would be required. 74
Once duty, breach, harm, and causation were established, Iridologist
might assert contributory negligence and assumption of risk as defenses. If he
could show that Client failed to pursue routine medical checkups or delayed in
consulting a physician when the rectal bleeding appeared, he could argue that
Client was contributorily negligent.' 75 If he could establish that Client know-
ingly and voluntarily consulted him only for his low energy and lack of appe-
tite-that is, that Client knew what Iridologist's methods and limitations were
and chose nonetheless to follow his recommendations-Iridologist would
have a strong assumption of risk defense. 176
168. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
170. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
171. B. JENSEN, supra note 165, at 13.
172. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 37.
173. Id. § 30.
174. See infra note 202.
175. See supra text accompanying note 69.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 60-68. Assumption of risk requires knowledge and appreciation of
the risk and voluntary acceptance of it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496D, 496E (1976).
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3. Express or Implied Warranty
In addition to the negligence claim, Client may also bring a breach of
express warranty action.The primary issue would be whether Iridologist guar-
anteed a cure or diagnosis or whether he merely expressed his opinion that a
better diet andregular exercise would increase Client's well-being.77 As indi-
cated earlier, 178 an implied warranty is not actionable.
4. An Alternative Contractual Approach
By altering the facts of the hypothetical, one can see the effects of a
well-conceived contract. Client begins with an examination by his family
physician, who finds nothing wrong. He then asks several friends about
iridologists with whom they have worked, the improvements in their health,
and their satisfaction with the results. Client checks with a practitioners'
association for names and backgrounds of other iridologists.
Client then visits the iridologist of his choice and explains that he would
like to increase his energy level. Iridologist explains that he cannot diagnose
or cure specific diseases but that he can help the client identify ways to
improve his general well-being. The two then discuss and form an agreement
on the following matters: 79
(a) Purpose of agreement. The parties agree that their mutual goal is to identify
changes Client may make in his lifestyle to increase his energy and general well-
being.
(b) Responsibilities. Iridologist agrees to use his training and experience, which he
describes, to identify areas of Client's body that exhibit weakness or distress. He
cannot diagnose specific diseases. He will recommend changes in habits that he
believes will improve these conditions. Should conditions appear during the
course of a normal iridological examination that require medical attention, he will
advise Client to consult a medical practitioner.
Client will follow Iridologist's dietary advice for four months. He recognizes that
these measures may not lead to rapid and dramatic "cure" and will require sub-
stantial effort.
(c) Working relationship. To encourage the success of the undertaking, the parties
agree that they will meet at one-month intervals to assess progress and discuss
difficulties. Should disagreements arise that they are unable to resolve, the parties
agree to consult a named, mutually respected person to mediate and to abide by
that person's decision.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 73-82.
178. See supra text accompanying note 74.
179. This agreement is a general sketch and is not intended to serve as a model contract.
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(d) Term of relationship;fees. The parties agree that the relationship will last for
four months. At the end of that time they will assess progress and satisfaction and
may continue the agreement for another period of two months. Either party may
refuse to renew the agreement. Should Iridologist determine, on examining Client
again, that the conditions are not responding to treatment, he will advise Client to
consult a physician. Fees shall be set at $x per visit, payable each time.
After an agreement has been reached, the scenario follows the facts in the
situation above. Iridologist examines Client and recommends dietary
changes, which Client follows in part. Client does not return at the specified
intervals and undergoes surgery for colon cancer a year after the initial visit.
At this point, what are Client's rights under the contract? He cannot
claim that Iridologist breached a contractual duty to diagnose because the
contract did not include that duty. This result accords with the negligence
analysis above, in which it was unlikely that a court would find a tort duty to
diagnose. 80
Under their agreement on responsibilities Client could claim breach of a
contractual duty to refer only if he could establish that conditions which
required medical attention became apparent and that Iridologist did not advise
Client to consult a physician. Iridologist is neither required nor expected to
diagnose pathological conditions; he must only report to Client readily per-
ceived conditions that his treatment may not affect. Similarly, negligence law
cannot logically create a duty to refer conditions that one is not required to
diagnose. 181
Thus, under the contract it will be unnecessary to establish by expert
testimony a duty of care imposed on the practitioner by law and defined by
the practice of other iridologists. The extent of the practitioner's duty is
explicit in the contract. In addition, Client not only has rights against
Iridologist, as under tort law, but also has explicit duties of his own. Unless he
believes that he has a very strong case against Iridologist on breach of con-
tractual duty, he will probably not sue at all since he did not fulfill his own
express contractual duties. He neither followed Iridologist's recommenda-
tions nor returned for the agreed periodic assessments. This result resembles
the strong contributory negligence defense available to the practitioner under
tort analysis.
If Client believes he was unfairly persuaded to enter the agreement, he
could claim undue influence or duress and, if successful, choose to avoid the
contract, recovering the fees he has paid. 82 If he can meet the higher eviden-
tiary requirements of a successful misrepresentation cause of action, he can
180. See supra text accompanying note 171.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 50-59.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42 & 145-46.
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also recover for injury. 183 A negligence action remains available, of course, if
he has sustained injury. 8"4 Client was fortunate to have had a choice of iridol-
ogists in this situation. Where practitioners are few, the piotection against
practitioner duress that is offered by competition will be weakened. 
85
In summary, if potential for harm exists through failure to diagnose a
specific disease, an agreement between practitioner and client provides
several advantages over a negligence approach. Should harm occur, a con-
tract obviates the need for extensive expert testimony to establish the appro-
priate standard of care. If Client has been pressured into an unfair agreement,
he is protected by tort law. Thus, when harm occurs a contract offers protec-
tions similar to those of tort law, yet simplifies the dispute.
When no harm occurs, a contract may still benefit the client. Changing
the facts of this hypothetical, assume that Client suffered merely from poor
general health and not from cancer. Although Client complained of fatigue,
his family doctor found no evidence of disease. Presumably the physician
therefore gave no corrective advice. If he did offer advice on diet, exercise, or
smoking, he may not have impressed its importance on Client to the extent
that an explicit contract would have done. Under his agreement with Iridolo-
gist, however, Client experienced results from the measures he took. Thus a
contract can be an instrument for bringing about specific effects in a healing
relationship.
B. Hypothetical B: Frustrated Expectations and Informed Consent
1. The Facts
Client, a model, visits Roller on the advice of friends. She complains of
chronic fatigue, tight muscles, and neck pain. Rolfer, who was trained in
physiology and massage at the Rolf Institute and is certified by its Board, 11
describes the Rolfing procedure and the theory behind it.
She tells Client that the treatment consists of ten sessions of deep mas-
sage, which will at times include heavy pressure on Client's body and may
elicit brief pain as restrictions in connective tissue are released in the process
of returning the body to its natural alignment. 87 Accident, chronic bad pos-
ture, and physical expression of stress or emotional attitudes can cause the
weight masses of head, chest, torso, and limbs to deviate from their natural
positions. 188 As the body's connective tissue (fascia)'8 9 strains to support
183. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 143 & 147.
185. Epstein, Contracting out of the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 20 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED.
228, 239 (1977).
186. ROLF INSTITUTE, 1980-81 CATALOG 3 (1980).
187. Roll', Structural Integration: A Contribution to the Understanding of Stress, 5 BULL. STRUCTURAL
INTEGRATION 5, 7 (1976).
188. Id.
189. Fascia: "[a] sheet of fibrous tissue which envelops the body beneath the skin, and also encloses the
muscles and groups of muscles, and separates their several layers or groups." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIC-
TIONARY 508 (23d ed. 1976).
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these distortions, it thickens, fixing the alterations.'0 The Rolfer then returns
the soft tissue to its "normal (anatomically efficient) position" through
manipulation. ' Greater freedom of motion results,In2 accompanied by an
increase in energy since energy is no longer wasted on simply holding the
body parts in position.193 The series of manipulations may be followed by
lessons in movement to maintain and enhance the effects of the Rolfing. 194
Client relates her medical and physical history, including at Roger's re-
quest those traumas, surgeries, and accidents that she recalls. She describes
her eating and exercise habits, as well as the stress she experiences at work.
They begin the series of sessions. Although these recommendations are not
part of standard treatment, Roger suggests that during the course of the
Rolfing Client eliminate caffeine from her diet and undertake moderate daily
exercise to counteract the effects of work-related stress.
After the final session Client is dissatisfied with the results. She still
experiences some tension in shoulders and neck and also has become an inch
taller following the release of constricted muscles and connective tissue. The
clothes she was engaged to model for a fashion magazine no longer fit proper-
ly, and she loses the job. Client sues Roger for breach of express warranty of
results and for lack of informed consent regarding the risks and effects of
treatment.
2. Breach of Warranty
The analysis here is similar to that in Hypothetical A. The court will have
to determine exactly what was said and what was promised, and whether
Rolfer's statements were express promises or merely descriptions or reassur-
ances.' 95 In this hypothetical it does not appear that Roger gave any express
warranty of results.
3. Lack of Informed Consent
Two issues must be resolved: (1) the scope of the required disclosure,
and (2) whether the failure to make a required disclosure led to Client's
alleged harm. 96
Regarding the scope of disclosure, Client would argue that she was not
adequately informed about the Rolfing procedure because Roller did not dis-
close the possible increase in height. A court that follows the traditional rule
would require expert testimony by other Rolfers on whether they inform their
clients of this possibility. 97 The standard would thus be set by other prac-
190. Roll, Structural hItegration: A Contribution to tie Understanding of Stress, 5 BULL. STRUCTURAL
INTEGRATION 5, 7 (1976).
191. Id. at 5.
192. Id. at 7.
193. Id. at 9.
194. ROLF INSTITUTE, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 3 (1981).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12 & 126-27.
197. See supra text accompanying note I11.
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titioners (who might not see height increases as a risk) and not by the needs of
this client, who, because of her profession, might require additional informa-
tion on potential body changes. In a materiality-rule jurisdiction this client's
unique need for additional information would be better protected because the
standard of disclosure would rest on what a reasonable person in her position
would require to make an intelligent, informed decision.' 98
Rolfer could argue that she need not provide all information to Client
since some of the "basic postulates"'99 of informed consent do not apply in
her field of practice. First, information on Rolfing and Rolfing practitioners is
readily available, and the process is not difficult to understand. Therefore,
Client does not suffer an abject dependence 200 on the practitioner for infor-
mation. Second, the common knowledge exception 20 1 to the duty to inform
may apply. Third, Client alone knew that a change in height would affect her
adversely and did not advise Rolfer of this fact.
Whether she sued in a traditional or materiality-rule jurisdiction, Client
would have to furnish expert testimony on risks of treatment and on causal-
ity. 202 Applying the subjective test of causality, the jury in a traditional juris-
diction would then decide whether Client would have declined Rolfing if she
had known of the possible height increase. In a materiality-rule jurisdiction
the jury would apply an objective test. In both jurisdictions the jury would
also determine whether the common knowledge exception applied.0 3 Client's
case would suffer if limited numbers of Rolfers were available to testify, or if
they were unwilling to testify against one of their colleagues.
In a traditional-rule jurisdiction Roller would most likely prevail if other
Rolfers do not normally discuss potential height increases with clients. In
contrast, under the materiality rule the jury could easily find for Client if it
believed that a model would forego Rolfing if she thought it would result in
professionally detrimental physical changes.
4. An Alternative Contractual Approach
Altering the situation to incorporate the initial interaction between Rolfer
and Client into a written agreement, the parties would consent in writing to
the following:
(a) Purpose of agreement. The parties agree to work together to reduce stress and
tension in Client's body and to strive for increased energy. The Rolfing method is
described and discussed.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 115-25.
199. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
200. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972).
201. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
202. Although the materiality test eliminates the need for expert testimony on the standard of disclosure in
the professional community, expert testimony is still required on other issues to establish: (1) the existence of
risks in the medical procedure, (2) the existence of other modes of treatment, (3) that plaintiffs injury vas
caused by an undisclosed risk, and (4) the existence of any physician's privilege of nondisclosure (such as
emergency or therapeutic silence). J. LUDLAM, supra note I 11, at 33. See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
203. J. LUDLAM, supra note I 11, at 37 n.94.
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(b) Responsibilities. Rolfer agrees to use her training and experience, which she
describes, in bringing Client's body closer to its natural alignment. She will stop
massage immediately when Client requests. She suggests actions Client may take
to enhance the effects of Rolfing.
Client promises to appear at specified times for the ten sessions. Client under-
stands that treatment may include heavy pressure and occasional brief pain. She
agrees to reduce caffeine intake and to exercise daily to counteract stress
buildup. ° 4
a. Guarantee of Results
The contract is in writing and its terms are explicit. It does not contain
language that promises a specific outcome: the parties have agreed only to
work together and to strive for results. Client's body will be brought closer to
its natural alignment, but the contract does not guarantee restoration of a
perfect, natural position. Caffeine reduction is to counteract the effects of
stress and enhance the effects of Rolf'mg, but Roller has not promised that all
traces of tension will disappear. For greater clarity, Rolfer would have been
wise to include a statement indicating that complete elimination of muscle
tension and attainment of a high level of energy are not guaranteed.
b. Unexpected Result: Increase in Height
The agreement does not mention the possibility of an increase in height.
The language "bringing the body closer to its natural alignment" could imply
such an increase, but this interpretation would require a reasonably thorough
knowledge of Rolfing, which the Client would not be expected to have. The
question becomes, what did Client know about Rolfing, and would she have
refused to enter this agreement had it mentioned possible height increases? In
words resembling the language of informed consent, did Roller fail to divulge
knowledge about Rolfing that, if known, would have materially influenced
Client's decision? 205
Incorporating detailed information about a holistic process into a written
agreement may discourage parties from drawing up simple, workable ar-
rangements. In situations like this hypothetical it may be more satisfactory to
delegate a thorough discussion of procedure and outcome to the oral stage of
agreement and to include in the written version a statement of all questions
and concerns raised by the client after an oral description of the particular
holistic process and of the practitioner's responses. The practitioner, how-
ever, must provide sufficient information for the client to understand what
will happen during treatment and to frame relevant questions. Guidelines for
204. A complete contract would be more extensive and would include terms such as those in Hypothetical
A. These terms are isolated in order to analyze the problems of warranty and informed consent.
205. Regarding the possibility of duress, coercion, and fraud in contract formation, refer to text accom-
panying notes 134-47 supra.
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this information might be provided by a practitioners' professional organiza-
tion. 2°
Thus, it becomes Client's responsibility to bring unique needs to the
attention of Rolfer, who does not know from previous training and experience
that a client may consider increased height detrimental. This result differs
from the traditional tort duty to disclose, under which a practitioner must
follow the standards of customary practice and need not ascertain the re-
quirements of individual clients. 07 If Client herself must make clear that a
change in height would be material to her decision, her unique needs are
protected to an even greater extent than under the materiality rule (provided
that she assumes this responsibility) because the standard will be what she
herself needs to know and not what a reasonable person in her position would
208require. Client may even require information that jurors would consider
unreasonable. 2 9 If she does not assume her responsibility, Rolfer will not be
penalized for failing to guess her needs. In addition, Rolfer gains some profes-
sional freedom under the contract: she recommended eliminating caffeine and
engaging in daily exercise, suggestions that are not standard Rolf'mg proce-
dure. In other words, a contract allows the parties to bargain for terms that
tort law would not require.
C. Hypothetical C: Physical Harm Occurs
1. The Facts
Varying the situation in Hypothetical B, assume that Client failed to
relate a childhood back injury to Rolfer. Between the fourth and fifth sessions
Client slipped and fell, but she did not notice any back pain until after the
sixth session. At that point she consulted a chiropractor, who readjusted her
spine during several visits and at some expense.
2. Tort Action and Results
Client, who believes that Rolfing exacerbated the old and new injuries,
sues Rolfer for negligence, claiming damages for chiropractic bills and for
pain and suffering.
The problems in a negligence cause of action are similar to those outlined
in Hypothetical A. Client will have to establish Rolfer's duty of care
210
206. The Rolf Institute, which trains and certifies all Rolfers, has established a Code of Ethics for practi-
tioners and also oversees practitioner competence and client complaints. ROLF INSTITUTE, CODE OF ETHICS
(1980); ROLF INSTITUTE, 1980-81 CATALOG 3 (1980). The California Health Practitioners Association has
published a provisional code of ethics. CALIFORNIA HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ASSOCIATION, PROVISIONAL
ETHICAL STANDARDS. Similar codes could include disclosure guidelines.
207. See supra text accompanying note Ill.
208. See supra text accompanying note 128.
209. The objective test of causation in informed consent "is inconsistent with the patient's right of self-
determination" because it "[denies] his right to act in what society would consider an unreasonable manner." J.
LUDLAM, supra note 11l, at 35-36.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 33-45.
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through expert testimony and will have to show a breach of this duty. 21' She
must prove harm and establish a causal connection between the alleged
breach and her injury. 2  Determining the issue of proximate cause will re-
quire extensive expert testimony. Was the Rolfing a substantial factor in
producing Client's harm? 2 3 Was the fall an intervening force, 2 4 and if so, was
it a superseding cause,2 5 which cuts off Rolfer's liability?
Causality in this situation is anything but clear. But if the trier of fact
finds that Rolfer's negligence was a substantial factor in Client's injury and
that the fall was not a superseding cause, Rolfer may choose to bring a
contributory negligence defense. Client failed to relate not only the childhood
injury, knowledge of which would have changed Rolfer's approach to her
back, but also the fall itself. Thus, Client should bear at least some of the
responsibility for subsequent pain and expense.
3. An Alternative Contractual Approach
The agreement above provides no special protections because the parties
did not foresee Client's fall. If a legitimate cause of action exists in negligence,
211. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 30.
212. Id.
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 433 (1965). Section 431 provides that:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his
negligence has resulted in the harm.
Section 433 lists considerations that are important in determining whether an act is a substantial factor in causing
harm:
The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another important in
determining whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the effect
which they have in producing it;
(b) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous and
active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation harmless unless acted upon by
other forces for which the actor is not responsible;
(c) lapse of time.
214. Id. § 441. This section defines intervening force: "An intervening force is one which actively operates
in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed."
215. Id. §§ 440, 442, 443. Section 440 defines superseding cause: "A superseding cause is an act of a third
person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." Section 442 presents criteria for determining
whether an intervening force is a superseding cause:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which would
otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be extraordi-
nary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created by the
actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or to his failure
to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is wrongful toward
the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening force in
motion.
Section 443 limits superseding causes to forces that are not normal consequences of the actor's conduct: "The
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this contract will neither bar that action 216 nor provide any particular ad-
vantages over it in court. But, because it warns Client in writing that Rolfer
will apply heavy pressure and that she should expect some pain, it may
impress on Client the importance of disclosing all injuries.
Such cautionary terms in a contract may actively prevent harm. For
example, if the following provision is included in the original agreement Client
will know that in Rolling all prior injuries are serious and that it is in her best
interest to give comprehensive information:
Client will provide Rolfer with a complete history of injuries, surgery, and trauma.
Rolfer promises to approach those sites with caution or not at all, according to her
training and experience. At the beginning of each session Client will report any
injuries or physical symptoms that have occurred since the last one.
With this agreement Client will be likely to report the fall. Rolfer will then be
able to refer her to a physician before continuing the sessions, avoiding pos-
sible exacerbation of the injury.
V. CONCLUSION
The amended agreements in these hypotheticals show that a carefully
drawn contract can provide to both parties advantages that tort law lacks. It
can make implied terms explicit and guard against misunderstandings over
both the expected results of, and the differences between, holistic care and
medical treatment. It can clarify the duties and responsibilities of each party,
including the responsibility to furnish information. A contract allows the
parties to bargain for terms that tort law would not automatically provide,
permitting practitioners to use nonstandard techniques and allowing clients to
protect their unique needs. A contract that does not contemplate unforeseen
harm provides no special advantages other than its cautionary effect, but a
tort action would still be available to determine the duties and liabilities of the
parties under tort law. In addition, as the third hypothetical indicates, a con-
tract may avert unexpected harm caused by misunderstanding or careless-
ness.
Negligence law already employs some of the principles on which a con-
tract between holistic practitioners and their clients would be based. The
defense of assumption of risk recognizes a client's right to choose a prac-
titioner and to accept that practitioner's methods. Contributory negligence
acknowledges that clients have substantial responsibility for their own care.
The tort duty to refer ensures that when a practitioner's methods apply only
to nonpathological conditions a client with symptoms of disease will receive
care from a physician. Finally, the doctrine of informed consent permits
intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is
not a superseding cause of harm which such conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about."
216. W. PROSSER, supra note 33, § 92.
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clients to make decisions affecting their physical health and enhances the role
of informed, intelligent participation by clients in the healing process.
However, negligence law recognizes neither the uniqueness of each prac-
titioner-client relationship nor the skills and needs of individual parties be-
cause it defines the relationship in terms of judicially imposed norms: cus-
tomary practice for the practitioner, and a reasonable person's judgment for
the client. These norms stifle holistic care, a field in which practices are
developing rapidly and lack the standardization of traditional medical tech-
niques. Tort norms also contradict the notion of individual responsibility, one
of the elements that is crucial to the effectiveness of holistic health care.
Ultimately, however, the efficacy of holistic practice is not the issue.
Because many members of the public seek holistic care, the law governing
holistic practice must ensure that a meaningful choice of practices and prac-
titioners exists. Contractual agreements between practitioners and clients
hold more promise of reaching this goal than does current tort law.
Heidi M. Rian

